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Workplace accidents and injuriesResearch has shown that safety climate predicts safety behavior and safety outcomes in a
variety of settings. Prior studies have focused on traditional work environments in which
employees and supervisors work in the same location and the mechanisms through which
safety climate affects behavior are largely understood. However, the nascent research
examining safety climate among lone workers suggests that safety climate may have some
uniqueness in this context. Based on leadership theories and utilizing an exploratory
approach, this study increases our understanding of the lone worker context by examining
employee perception of safety climate and supervisory interpretation of safety climate;
how similar or different they are, and how they are related to important safety outcomes.
Surveys were administered to a matched sample of 1831 truck drivers and their 219 super-
visors at four different trucking companies. Objective data on employee injuries were col-
lected six months after survey administration. The results provided support for the
measurement equivalence of the Trucking Safety Climate Scale at the organization level
for both employee and supervisor respondents. For both organization- and group-level
safety climate, employee perceptions of safety climate and supervisory interpretation of
safety climate were signiﬁcantly different, such that supervisors provided higher ratings
for both safety climate sub-scales. Further, only employee safety climate perceptions sig-
niﬁcantly predicted self-reported safety behavior (directly) and objective injury outcomes
(indirectly). This suggests that when trying to gauge and improve upon a trucking com-
pany’s safety climate, we should rely on employee perspectives, rather than supervisory
interpretation, of safety climate.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1. Introduction
Occupational safety is an issue with signiﬁcant ﬁnancial and societal consequences. In 2011, there were over 4600 fatal
workplace injuries in the U.S. (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012). According to the 2012 Liberty Mutual Workplace SafetyA 01748,
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sation costs (Liberty Mutual Research Institute for Safety, 2012). When considering both direct and indirect costs of all
occupational injuries and illnesses, estimates are as high as $250 billion annually (Leigh, 2011).
While there has been a resurgence in workplace safety research in recent years, there are still many gaps that need to be
addressed in order to improve the health and safety of workers. One major gap regards how to improve safety among lone
workers (e.g., truck drivers), deﬁned as employees who work alone and perform an activity that is intended to be carried out
in isolation from other workers, without close or direct supervision (British Security Industry Association, 2010; Hughes &
Ferrett, 2009). There is reason to believe that the mechanisms through which safety climate inﬂuences behavior are different
among lone workers as compared to those in a traditional work environment. In developing and validating safety climate
scales for lone workers (using truck drivers as an exemplar), Huang et al. (2013) found that truck drivers’ safety climate
perceptions predicted drivers’ safety behaviors and future road injuries, and their industry-speciﬁc items provided stronger
predictive value in safe driving behavior than did generic safety climate items. This suggests that taking the context of the
work environment into account is important in understanding safety climate for lone workers (speciﬁcally, truck drivers).
In the Huang et al. study (2013), the authors found that, contrary to the established conceptualization of safety climate
(e.g., Zohar, 1980, 2000, 2011), there were no shared safety climate perceptions among the groups of lone workers that they
studied. This implies that in the unique context of trucking, something other than shared perceptions with peers may be
informing employees’ safety climate perceptions. A study from Zohar, Huang, Lee, and Robertson (2014) showed that
dispatcher (distant) leadership (measured by the Leader-Member Exchange scale; Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995) is a signiﬁcant
antecedent of truck drivers’ safety climate perceptions, driving behaviors, and hard-braking frequencies (i.e., accident
near-miss events). Thus, absent frequent contact with co-workers, the dispatcher (supervisor), despite her/her remoteness,
is likely to be the primary conduit through which the employee picks up the informational elements upon which to base his/
her safety climate perceptions. In turn, these informational elements are presumably based on the dispatcher’s own inter-
pretation of organizational-level safety climate and his/her own values and attitudes. For in-house workers, the supervisor’s
role in this transmission would be supplemented by co-workers.
Continuing this line of lone worker/truck driver research, and based on leadership theories, the current study compares
supervisory interpretation of safety climate and employee safety climate perceptions in order to better understand the
antecedents of lone worker safety, which ultimately impacts accident and injury outcomes. Speciﬁcally, this study makes
the following three contributions: (1) it demonstrates measurement equivalence (ME) of the organization-level safety
climate sub-scale items among employee and supervisor respondents. Establishment of ME allows meaningful and fair com-
parisons of ratings on a single scale from multiple parties; (2) it is the ﬁrst study to explore the similarity or difference
between supervisory interpretation of safety climate versus employee safety climate perception for lone workers (using dis-
patcher and truck drivers as exemplar, respectively), for both organizational-level and group-level safety climate percep-
tions; and (3) it expands prior research by testing simultaneously the impact of supervisory interpretation of safety
climate and employee safety climate perception on safety outcomes.
1.1. Safety climate
Research has shown that safety climate (traditionally deﬁned as workers’ shared perceptions of their organization’s
policies, procedures, and practices as it relates to the value and importance of safety within the organization; Grifﬁn &
Neal, 2000; Zohar, 1980, 2000, 2011) predicts safety behavior and safety outcomes (such as accidents and injuries) in a vari-
ety of settings (e.g., Beus, Payne, Bergman, & Arthur, 2010; Christian, Bradley, Wallace, & Burke, 2009). It is a multilevel con-
struct comprising two levels: organization-level safety climate (employees’ perceptions of the company’s commitment to
and prioritization of safety) and group-level safety climate (employees’ perceptions of their direct supervisors’ commitment
to and prioritization of safety) (e.g., Zohar, 2008). While similar to safety culture, safety climate is a distinct construct. Safety
culture is deﬁned as shared values and beliefs that interact with an organization’s structure and control systems to produce
behavioral norms (Reason, 1998; Thompson, 1996). Safety climate, on the other hand, focuses on workers’ perceptions. In
other words, safety climate can be viewed as a measurable marker of safety culture (e.g., Huang et al., 2013).
1.2. The need for studying safety climate among lone workers/truck drivers
A ‘‘lone worker’’ can be anyone who works on his/her own, either regularly or occasionally, without access to immediate
support from coworkers or managers (National Health Service (NHS), 2005). In today’s workforce, an increasing number of
employees perform work assignments away from the traditional ofﬁce setting, either because the type of work they perform
requires them to do so, or because advances in technology have allowed for ﬂexibility in work location (Golden, Veiga, &
Dino, 2008). While professional isolation has only recently come into the spotlight in the behavioral science literature, some
research has begun to suggest that remote workers may feel ‘‘out of the loop’’ (Baruch & Nicholson, 1997) and experience a
decreased sense of belonging (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), among other negative outcomes. However, other studies have
shown that there can be a positive side to working remotely. For example, Gajendran and Harrison (2007) found that isolated
workers experienced increased perceived autonomy and lower work-family conﬂict. They also found that telecommuting did
not have detrimental effects on workplace relationships (except for those who telecommuted for the majority of their
workweek).
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et al., 2010; Christian et al., 2009; Huang, Chen, & Grosch, 2010; Zohar, 2010), most have focused on traditional work envi-
ronments. Traditional employees, also referred to as in-house workers, have many opportunities throughout the day to
interact with one another and synthesize their ﬁrst-hand experiences of formal and informal policies and procedures;
however, as mentioned above, some employees work away from a traditional ofﬁce setting (e.g., telecommuters or those
working in the trucking, utility, and airline industries). Because lone working is becoming increasingly common, and rel-
atively little is known about workplace safety attitudes and behaviors in this context, it is important that safety climate
research begin to address lone workers. The current study focuses on lone workers and uses long-haul truck drivers as an
example.
The trucking transportation industry is inherently dangerous. In 2010, there were 396 fatalities in the trucking industry
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012). The same data also showed that the trucking industry experienced nearly ten times more
fatalities (with a rate of 31.8 per 100,000 workers) than the cross-industry average (with a rate of 3.6 per 100,000 workers).
Furthermore, non-fatal injuries occur at a rate of 5.3 per 100 full-time truck drivers while the average across private indus-
tries is 2.9 per 100 workers (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012). Finally, accidents in the trucking industry can involve other
commercial or passenger vehicles and property, compounding the negative impact of these events; this showcases the need
for further study of accident prevention in this industry.
1.3. Gaps in literature related to supervisory interpretation of safety climate
Because safety climate is deﬁned as employees’ shared perceptions, prior studies have mainly focused on only front-line
employee safety climate perceptions. There is interest, however, in exploring views of other members of organizations (i.e.,
managers and supervisors; see Cheyne, Tomas, Cox, & Oliver, 2003; Cox, Tomas, Cheyne, & Oliver, 1998; Huang et al., 2012;
Zohar & Luria, 2010), in addition to the general employees, in order to better understand the antecedents of worker safety
and the impact on accident and injury outcomes. It is suggested that exploring the similarities and differences of safety atti-
tudes and climate between occupational levels is particularly important for planned improvements that target all employees
at all levels (e.g., Cheyne et al., 2003). Since safety climate is traditionally deﬁned with respect to employees’ perceptions, the
current study utilized the approach of Zohar and Luria (2010) by deﬁning supervisors’ responses to survey items relating to
organization safety priorities and commitment to safety as supervisory interpretation of safety climate.
Prior research, however, has produced inconclusive or contradictory ﬁndings between occupational levels (i.e., manage-
ment and workforce) within the same organization in terms of the interpretations of safety climate. Some studies have
suggested that there may be a positive relationship between a leader’s own attitudes and perception of safety and his/
her employees’ safety climate perception. Drawing from the literature, there are several potential reasons for the
similarity.
1.3.1. Similarity between supervisory interpretation and employee perception: organizational-level safety climate
It has often been said in the literature that ‘‘leaders create climate’’ (Lewin et al., 1939). This is consistent with the
research that shows that management commitment to safety is the most important dimension of safety climate (e.g.,
Zohar, 1980, 2000). A key feature of safety climate is the equivalence, or parity, of espoused and enacted policies, meaning
that what managers say and what they do are in alignment (Argyris & Schon, 1996; Simons, 2002). The extent to which such
alignment exists at the top management/organizational level should be perceived by supervisors and, in turn, transmitted to
their direct reports. Zohar and Luria (2010) found, in fact, that supervisors can affect organizational climate perceptions of
group members through their role as communicators and interpreters of climate (called informing behavior or mediating
behavior); therefore, supervisors’ individual assessments and members’ assessments of the same organizational climate cues
should be correlated (Zohar & Luria, 2010). This impact should be particularly salient in the case of lone workers given the
absence of frequent interaction of employees with co-workers (Zohar et al., 2014).
1.3.2. Similarity between supervisory interpretation and employee perception: group-level safety climate
Supervisors create climate for their work groups (leaders create climate). If what supervisors say and what they do are in
alignment, it is very likely that supervisor and employee would have a similar interpretation of group-level safety climate.
Such supervisory impact should, in turn, result in the development of shared mental models for both group members and
supervisors regarding their experiences in the workplace (Rouse & Morris, 1986). Mental models, or organized knowledge
structures, allow people to interact with their environment by helping them to predict and explain behavior, recognize
and remember relationships among components in the environment, and construct expectations regarding what is likely
to occur next (Rouse & Morris, 1986). According to Stout, Cannon-Bowers, and Salas (1996), developing shared mental mod-
els among employees is most important in situations where coworkers cannot communicate freely with one another, since
they cannot directly discuss their job demands and issues. Rather, they rely on these schemas of information to make sense
of their environment. To the extent that mental models of supervisors and their employees contain overlapping elements of
knowledge regarding safety-related policies, practices and procedures, supervisory interpretation of safety climate and
employee safety climate perception should be similar. Moreover, we should expect not only an absence of statistically
signiﬁcant differences between average supervisor and employee scores, but we should also expect that the capability to
predict safety outcomes should be similar.
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On the other hand, situations that lead to disharmony in interpretations of safety climate between supervisors and their
employees have also been identiﬁed in the literature. Differences have been uncovered between occupational levels (i.e.,
management and workforce) within the same organizations in terms of the interpretations of safety attitudes and climate
(e.g., Cox et al., 1998; Cheyne et al., 2003; Huang et al., 2012).
1.3.3.1. Gate-keeper model. Conceptually, it is possible to understand such differences by considering the gatekeeper func-
tion of the supervisor (Zohar & Luria, 2010). As such, the supervisor’s mental model contains knowledge structures, parts
of which are constructed from his/her perception of top management policies. These knowledge structures include proce-
dural as well as declarative components (Blickensdorfer et al., 2000). The supervisor’s everyday interactions with direct
reports will be, to a great extent, inﬂuenced by the content of his/her mental models. In turn, the informational elements
contained in these interactions will, for the case of lone workers, form the primary basis of employee perceptions of safety
climate.
If the supervisor’s perception of the degree of parity between espoused and enacted policies (Eakin, 1992; Paté-Cornell,
1990; Wright, 1986) of top management is discrepant with his/her own beliefs and actions, the result could be a source of
employee-supervisor differences in organization-level safety climate. One way this might occur is if top management poli-
cies lacked parity (i.e., safety is important but productivity always comes ﬁrst), but the gatekeeping function of the super-
visor was one of mitigation; developing procedures to protect employee safety. In this case, the supervisor would
(realistically) interpret the organizational safety climate to be lower than the employees’ perceptions which are ﬁltered
through the more positive actions of the supervisor. In another example, top management policy might well be one of
enacted-espoused parity, whereas the supervisor is willing to disregard safety policies/procedures when production falls
behind. Here, the supervisor would interpret the organizational safety climate as higher than the employees’ perceptions
which are now ﬁltered through the less positive actions of the supervisor. In both cases, the mechanism underlying the
supervisor-employee difference is a functional discrepancy in the content of the supervisor mental model between those
knowledge structures representing his/her understanding of management policy and a different set of knowledge structures
representing operational day to day procedures and practices. However, the employees’ mental model is primarily derived
from interaction with the supervisor.
1.3.3.2. Opportunity to observe. An additional possibility for explaining supervisor-employee differences is that supervisors
have greater opportunity to observe and have more frequent interaction with upper levels of management (e.g., Lawler,
1967). Cheyne et al. (2003), collecting data from two manufacturing companies, found that the different work levels exhib-
ited different interpretations of safety climate, reﬂecting the view from their levels. Managers had the most positive views,
followed by supervisors, and then general employees, who had the least positive views. Cheyne et al. (2003), however, did
not link these perceptions to safety outcomes. If, in our own study, supervisors, being closer to the top, are better able to
discern the true priorities of upper management (e.g., safety over competing demands), then supervisor scores for organiza-
tion-level safety climate may be stronger predictors of safety performance than employee perceptions and more related to a
company’s safety outcomes.
1.3.3.3. Social desirability. Alternatively, social desirability bias (e.g., Maccoby &Maccoby, 1954) may explain the organization
level differences between supervisors’ and their employees’ perceptions. Supervisors may identify with upper management
in their companies and may alter their answers to enhance the company image. Respondents are often unwilling or unable to
report accurately on sensitive topics and the result is data that are systematically biased toward respondents’ perceptions of
what is ‘‘correct’’ or socially acceptable, so-called social desirability bias (e.g., Maccoby & Maccoby, 1954).
1.3.4. Differences between supervisory interpretation and employee perception: group-level safety climate
1.3.4.1. Discrepancy between espoused and enacted policies at group level. If signiﬁcant differences exist between group-level
employee perceptions of supervisors and the supervisors self-assessments of safety climate, it is possible that lack of parity
between espoused and enacted policies, discussed earlier with reference to top management, extends to the group level. For
example, a given supervisor may be aware of, and believe he/she supports, management policy against employees’ use of cell
phones while driving (declarative knowledge component of supervisor mental model). At the same time, if production
pressures are high, the supervisor may judge the situation to be ‘‘exceptional’’ and call the driver on the road (procedural
knowledge component of supervisor mental model). The supervisor may not be aware of this discrepancy and, while answer-
ing the safety climate survey, interprets his/her own behavior as consistent with his/her declarative knowledge of manage-
ment policy as well as aligned with messages he/she thinks he/she has sent to the work group. However, the messages
received by group members, which form the primary basis for their safety climate perception, may not be what the super-
visor thought he/she sent (e.g., ‘‘exceptions’’ occur more frequently than the supervisor realizes). Role theory (Katz & Kahn,
1978; Merton, 1957) distinguishes between sent and received (i.e., interpreted) role expectations and the fact that the two
might be misaligned due to the idiosyncrasies of interpersonal communication.
1.3.4.2. Self-assessment bias. Alternatively, studies of multi-source feedback and performance ratings (e.g., employee versus
supervisor sources) have repeatedly shown inconsistencies among raters indicating that self-appraisals are higher than
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between supervisory interpretation of safety climate versus employee safety climate perceptions, and supervisors may give
higher scores on the safety climate survey.
1.3.5. Signiﬁcance of study outcomes
The literature has shown that employees’ safety climate perception is one of the best predictors of organizational safety
outcomes. If evidence can be shown that leaders’ interpretations of safety climate are similar their employees, it may imply
that leaders’ interpretation of organizational safety climate could be a good leading indicator of safety outcomes as well. If
our evidence shows no similarity, this is still useful information. Prior studies (e.g., Cheyne et al., 2003) have suggested that
the fact that management sees things differently from the general workforce is important in terms of promoting a positive
and appropriate culture for safety. It has implications for the success of improvement programs aimed at all employment
levels.
To ﬁll a gap in the literature, the present study aims to investigate the etiology and consequences of safety climate in the
trucking industry by examining supervisory interpretation of safety climate and employee safety climate perceptions; how
similar or different they are, and how they are related to important safety outcomes.
1.4. Comparing supervisory interpretation of organization-level safety climate and employee organization-level safety climate
perception
Since the organization-level survey portion was identical for both employees and supervisors, with the company (top
management) as the referent for both, our ﬁrst objective (Objective 1) was to determine whether the organization-level
safety climate sub-scale had the same measurement implications among employee and supervisor respondents (in other
words, to test measurement equivalence of the organization-level safety climate sub-scale). The literature has suggested that
a psychological measure can be interpreted in considerably different ways across different groups of people because partic-
ular concepts used in the measure and item wordings might be understood differently across the groups. Moreover, the ref-
erence point for scale item endorsement can differ across groups. For example, on a 5-point Likert scale, a score of three can
be viewed as high or good enough in certain groups, whereas the same rating can be viewed as below average or poor in
other groups. Thus, measurement equivalence (Raju, Lafﬁtte, & Byrne, 2002) should be established in order to make mean-
ingful and fair comparisons of ratings on a single scale frommultiple parties. If measurement equivalence was observed, this
would imply that it is appropriate to compare supervisor and employee scores (and that the meaning of responses is the
same for both groups).
If measurement equivalence can be established, Objective 2 would be to explore whether or not employee and supervisor
scores on the organization-level safety climate sub-scale were statistically similar or different. If these scores are statistically
different, the next step would be to determine which was more predictive of safety behavior and injury severity: supervisory
interpretation of organization-level safety climate or employee organization-level safety climate perceptions (Objective 3).
Though it seems likely that employee perceptions would be more strongly related to employees’ own safety behavior and
injury severity, the lone work context may again affect this relationship. It is possible that because supervisors are more
informed of upper management’s commitment to safety, they have a better understanding of organizational factors that
could impact safety outcomes.
1.5. Comparing employee group-level safety climate perceptions with supervisor self-appraisals
We further explored employees’ ratings versus supervisory interpretation of group-level safety climate. For the group-
level safety climate sub-scale, the employees and supervisors had different questions. The referent was the supervisor in
both cases, such that employees were providing an upward-appraisal of their supervisor, while supervisors were providing
a self-appraisal regarding commitment to safety.
Objective 4 was to explore whether or not employee scores on the group-level safety climate sub-scale and supervisor
self-appraisals were statistically different. If so, the next step would be to determine which are more predictive of safety
behavior and injury severity: employee group-level safety climate perceptions or supervisors’ self-appraisals (Objective 5).
2. Method
2.1. Participants and procedure
The data used in the current study are a subset of data originally collected as part of a larger study that developed and
validated a trucking industry-speciﬁc safety climate scale (Huang et al., 2013; Zohar et al., 2014). The details of how the sur-
vey was distributed and collected were provided in Huang et al., 2013.
The participants were all long-haul truck drivers. Even though groups of drivers may share the same dispatcher (super-
visor), they have little to no opportunity to interact with their co-workers and often do not even know who their co-workers
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in-vehicle radio devices and cell phones, with many never even meeting in person (Zohar et al., 2014).
The survey was delivered to all the participants using a web-based platform. Data utilized in the study were collected
from four trucking companies in the U.S. where both dispatchers and truck drivers participated in the project. The dataset
included a matched sample of 1831 employees and their 219 supervisors. The response rates across the companies ranged
from 34% to 73%, with a mean around 44%. This is the ﬁrst time in this series of studies that supervisor data were utilized in
the analysis.
Participants were promised conﬁdentiality, using a double-blind coding system approved by the Research Institute IRB.
The trucking company did not know who participated and did not have access to the survey data, while the research team
did not have the names of the participants. Six months after survey completion, performance outcomes were provided to us
from the participating companies. No names were provided; only the company IDs were used to link the information. Super-
visor and employee survey results were matched by the project team with performance data. Such a prospective design
allows more stringent testing of the predictive validity of the study’s variables.
In terms of participants’ characteristics, the average age of the 1831 truck drivers was 42.5 (SD = 5.9) years; average ten-
ure as a professional driver was 12.1 (SD = 9.6) years; and average employment at the current company was 5.1 (SD = 5.7)
years. All were long-haul drivers and not unionized. Also, 67.9% reported they were paid by the hour and 32.1% of partici-
pants were paid by the mile.
For the participating supervisors (n = 219), 22.1% were 20–29 years old, 33.8% were 30–39 years old, 25.0% were
40–49 years old, and 19.1% were over 50. On average, each had been a supervisor for 7.6 years (SD = 6.9) and 35.0% of them
had previous experience working as a truck driver. No signiﬁcant differences were observed with regard to the demographic
or descriptive statistics associated with survey variables.
2.2. Measures
2.2.1. Trucking safety climate (TSC)
Safety climate was measured using the 40-item Trucking Safety Climate Scale (Huang et al., 2013). Scale items refer both
to company policies and procedures and supervisory practices, accompanied by a 5-point scale ranging from strongly
disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). This scale consists of two sub-scales: 20 items of organization-level safety climate (e.g.,
My company cares more about my safety than on-time delivery; My company turns a blind eye when a supervisor bends
some safety rules) and 20 items of group-level safety climate (e.g., Supervisors are strict about driving safely even when
we are tired or stressed; My supervisor pushes me to keep driving even when I call in to say I feel too sick or tired). All
responses for items with negative wordings were reversely coded. The 20 questions of the organization-level sub-scale were
the same for both employees and supervisors, focusing on the company’s commitment to and prioritization of safety. For the
group-level safety climate sub-scale, there were separate questions for employees and supervisors, such that the referent
was the supervisor in both cases. Employee items required them to refer to their supervisor (e.g., ‘‘My supervisor
compliments employees who pay special attention to safety’’) while supervisors were asked to refer to themselves (e.g.,
‘‘I compliment my employees who pay special attention to safety’’). Employees were providing an upward-appraisal of their
supervisor, while supervisors were providing a self-appraisal regarding commitment to safety.
Internal consistency statistics for employees’ organization- and group-level safety climate sub-scales were satisfactory
with Cronbach’s a = .91 and .94, respectively. For supervisors’ organization- and group-level safety climate sub-scales, Cron-
bach’s a statistics were respectively .90 and .90, also indicating good internal consistency.
2.2.2. Subjective safety outcome measure: safety behavior
The participating truck drivers’ self-reported driving safety behavior was measured by six items adapted from Huang,
Roetting, McDevitt, Melton, and Smith (2005) and utilized in Huang et al. (2013). An example of the items is ‘‘I always com-
ply with the posted speed limits.’’ The items were measured on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly
agree) and demonstrated a marginally acceptable level of inter-item reliability of Cronbach’s a = .66.
2.2.3. Objective safety outcome measure: lost work days (injury severity)
Given that the measure of driving safety behavior was based on respondents’ self-reports, a socially desirable response
tendency could be expected, which might compromise the objectivity of the measure. To address this concern, objective
safety data were collected. Road injury, the objective safety criterion used in this study, was operationalized as lost work
days (over the past six months) due to injury and was collected six months after the survey implementation. One notable
advantage of using the road injury variable is that it can convey comprehensive information about safety outcomes, unlike
simple accident or injury frequency, which does not take into account the severity, fatality, or overall cost of incidents. By its
nature, the number of lost work days is a count variable, which is less likely to follow a normal distribution (i.e., zero for the
majority of truck drivers) and should not be used as a dependent variable in ordinary least-square regression modeling
(Cameron & Trivedi, 1998). Thus, a Poisson log-link generalized linear modeling (GLM) approach was used to examine the
hypothesized paths from safety climate and safety behavior to lost work days.
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To address Objective 1, measurement equivalence (ME) was tested with a multi-group conﬁrmatory factor analysis (CFA)
approach (Raju et al., 2002). CFA is used to verify a hypothesized factor structure of observed variables (i.e., item scores) and
test a relationship between observed variables and their underlying latent factors. CFA-based ME testing is carried out by
comparing several models with different numbers of equal parameter constraints. Speciﬁcally, invariance of measurement
structure (i.e., conﬁgural invariance), item-loadings onto latent factors (i.e., metric invariance), reference points of item rat-
ings (i.e., scalar invariance), residual variances of items (i.e., residual invariance), variances of latent factors (i.e., factor var-
iance invariance), and covariances of latent factors (i.e., factor covariance invariance) were examined as Vandenberg and
Lance (2000) proposed. If these measurement properties are not notably heterogeneous across employees and supervisors,
the addition of equal parameter constraints on them would not result in signiﬁcant model ﬁt worsening, which can be
judged by comparative ﬁt index (CFI) decreases greater than .02 (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002) and disappearance of the overlap
of root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) 90% conﬁdence interval (Wang & Russel, 2005). Perfect ME indicates
that operations of the safety climate scale’s items and latent factors are homogeneous across employees and supervisors.
Discrepancy in the safety climate scale score between the two groups when solid ME is established can be attributable to
a true score difference in the safety climate, rather than heterogeneous measurement implications.
To address Objectives 2 and 4 (comparison of supervisor versus employee ratings of organization- and group-level safety
climate), paired sample t-tests were conducted as well as mixed effect ANOVA. Path analysis was performed to test the links
from employee safety climate perception and supervisory interpretation of safety climate to safety behavior and lost work
days due to road injury (Objectives 3 and 5). Particularly, a full mediation effect of safety behavior on the safety climate and
objective safety outcome relationship was examined. Unlike the original path model, safety climate was divided into two
components, such that the safety behavior and objective safety outcome variables were regressed on organization-level
safety climate as perceived or interpreted by employees or supervisors.
3. Results
3.1. Preliminary analysis
Tables 1A and B present means, standard deviations, intercorrelations, and reliabilities of study variables for employee
and supervisor responses, respectively. Strong correlations were observed between organization- and group-level safety cli-
mate dimensions perceived by employees (r = .70, p < .01) and interpreted by supervisors (r = .75, p < .01). Employees’ per-
ceptions of organization- and group-level safety climate dimensions were signiﬁcantly correlated with safe driving behavior
with r = .43 and .45 (p < .01), respectively. Lost work days due to road injury showed large deviance statistics (SD = 6.79) with
a mean of .33, indicating that the vast majority of participating truck drivers (85.7%) reported zero days lost, as originally
expected.
3.2. Organization-level safety climate comparisons
Measurement equivalence (ME) was tested with a multi-group CFA approach. Strong measurement equivalence was
observed (Objective 1), showing that appropriate and meaningful comparisons can be made between employee organiza-
tion-level safety climate and supervisory interpretation of organization-level safety climate. The addition of a series of equal
parameter constraints did not result in signiﬁcant model ﬁt deterioration (i.e., the CFI reductions were not greater than .02
and 90% RMSEA conﬁdence intervals overlapped sequentially for each model). The results can be found in Table 2.Table 1
Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations among study variables.
Mean (SD) 1 2 3 4
A. Employees (n = 1831)
1. OSC 3.95 (.68) (.91)
2. GSC 4.05 (.76) .75** (.94)
3. Safety behavior 4.39 (.60) .43** .45** (.66)
4. Lost work days .33 (6.79) .03 .02 .07** –
Mean (SD) 1 2
B. Supervisors (n = 219)
1. OSC 4.18 (.57) (.90)
2. GSC 4.45 (.48) .70** (.90)
Notes: OSC: organization-level safety climate, GSC: group-level safety climate. Injury severity variable is a count variable and its correlations with other
variables should not be interpreted as the ordinary zero-order correlation.
** p < .01
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zation-level safety climate scores were signiﬁcantly different, t(1830) = 6.41, p < .01 (Objective 2). The results of this anal-
ysis are located in Table 3. Speciﬁcally, results showed that scores of supervisors’ interpretations were statistically higher
than those of their employees. In the paired-sample data, employee perception and supervisor ratings were signiﬁcantly,
but weakly correlated (r = .05, p < .05). In order to supplement the limitation of applying paired sample t-test to the nested
data in which numbers of employees and supervisors are not equal (i.e., measures from the same supervisor are not inde-
pendent), a mixed effect ANOVA was conducted. This method separates the within- and between-group variability to resolve
the dependency problem associated with a nested data structure (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). The result was fairly similar to
the paired t-test with c00 = .16 (SE = .05, p < .01), indicating signiﬁcantly higher scores for supervisory interpretation of
safety climate than employee safety climate perceptions. Path analysis (Fig. 1) showed that employees’ organization-level
safety climate better predicted safety behavior (directly) and injuries (indirectly) than did supervisors’ interpretations
(Objective 3). Speciﬁcally, employee organization-level safety climate was associated with safety behavior with an unstan-
dardized coefﬁcient = .36 (SE = .05, p < .01), while supervisor interpretations were not signiﬁcantly related to safety behavior
with an unstandardized coefﬁcient of .03 (SE = .05, p = .59). Safety behavior was linked with the number of lost work days
due to injury with an unstandardized coefﬁcient of 1.24 (SE = .17, p < .01). The full mediation effect of safety behavior in
linking the relationship between employee organization-level safety climate and lost work days was .45 (SE = .09, Sobel’s
Z = 7.09, 20,000 bootstrapped 95% CI = .63 to .29) and it was statistically signiﬁcant (p < .01). However, the full media-
tion effect of safety behavior in linking the relationship between supervisory interpretation of organization-level safety cli-
mate and lost work days was not signiﬁcant (indirect effect = .03, SE = .06, Sobel’s Z = .54, 20,000 bootstrapped 95%
CI = .15 to .08). Together, employee perception and supervisory interpretation of organization-level safety climate
explained 17% of the total safety behavior variance.
3.3. Group-level safety climate comparisons
A paired-sample t-test showed that employee scores on the group-level safety climate sub-scale and supervisor self-
appraisals were statistically different, t(1810) = 22.73, p < .01 (Objective 4). The results of this analysis are located in
Table 4.
Speciﬁcally, supervisors’ self-appraisals of their own commitment and prioritization of safety were higher than their
employees’ perceptions. Employees’ and supervisors’ ratings in the paired-sample data were signiﬁcantly, but weakly
correlated (r = .06, p < .01). The mixed effect ANOVA result (c00 = .47, SE = .04, p < .01) was congruent with the paired
t-test.
In the path analysis (Fig. 2), employees’ group-level safety climate predicted safety behavior (directly) and injuries
(indirectly) better than supervisors’ interpretations (Objective 5). Group-level safety climate perceived by employees was linked
to safety behavior with an unstandardized coefﬁcient of .33 (SE = .05, p < .01), while supervisors’ rating was only minimally
linked to safety behavior with an unstandardized coefﬁcient of .01 (SE = .04, p = .63). The relationship between safety
behavior and the number of lost work days due to injury was signiﬁcant (unstandardized coefﬁcient = 1.24, SE = .17,
p < .01). The relationship between employees’ group-level safety climate and lost work days was fully mediated by safety
behavior with an unstandardized coefﬁcient of .40 (SE = .09, Sobel’s Z = 4.73, 20,000 bootstrapped 95% conﬁdence inter-
val = .58 to .25), which was statistically signiﬁcant (p < .01). However, the mediating effect of safety behavior on the asso-
ciation between supervisors’ rating and lost work days was not signiﬁcant (coefﬁcient = .02, SE = .05, Sobel’s Z = .33, 20,000
bootstrapped 95% CI = .08 to .11). Employee group-level safety climate perceptions and supervisor interpretations could
explain 17% of the total safety behavior variance.Table 2
Measurement equivalence testing with multi-group CFA approach (1831 employees & 219 supervisors).
TSC-O v2 (df) CFI TLI RMSEA (90% CI)
Step 1: conﬁgural invariance model 2109.229 (334) .987 .983 .051 (.049–.053)
Step 2: metric invariance model 2206.092 (351) .986 .983 .051 (.049–.053)
Step 3: scalar invariance model 2587.162 (371) .983 .981 .054 (.052–.056)
Step 4: residual invariance model 2992.799 (391) .980 .979 .057 (.055–.059)
Step 5: factor variance invariance model 3025.060 (394) .980 .979 .057 (.055–.059)
Step 6: factor co-variance invariance model 3039.589 (397) .980 .979 .057 (.055–.059)
Notes: TSC-O = Trucking Safety Climate – Organization Level.
CFI: comparative ﬁt index. TLI: Tucker-Lewis index. RMSEA: root mean square error of approximation. CI: conﬁdence interval.
Step 1: conﬁgural invariance model (equal factor structure).
Step 2: metric invariance model (equal factor structure + equal factor loadings).
Step 3: scalar invariance model (equal factor structure + equal factor loadings + equal intercepts).
Step 4: invariant uniqueness model (equal factor structure + equal factor loadings + equal intercepts + equal uniquenesses).
Step 5: invariant factor variance model (equal factor structure + equal factor loadings + equal intercepts + equal uniquenesses + equal factor variance).
Step 6: invariant factor covariance model (equal factor structure + equal factor loadings + equal intercepts + equal uniquenesses + equal factor vari-
ance + equal factor covariance).
Table 3
Paired-sample t-test comparing employee organization-level safety climate perceptions and supervisory interpretations (1831 employees & 219 supervisors).
Paired Differences t df
Mean S.E. 95% CI
TSC-O .13 .02 .17 to .09 6.41** 1830
Notes: TSC-O = Trucking Safety Climate – Organization Level.
.36**TSC-O-emp
.03 -1.24**
-.01 Lost Work 
Days
Safety
Behavior
TSC-O-sup
Fig. 1. Indirect effect of organization-level safety climate perceptions on lost work days due to road injury via safety behavior. Note: TSC-O-emp = employee
organization-level trucking safety climate perceptions; TSC-O-sup = supervisory interpretation of organization-level trucking safety climate; ** p < .01.
.33**TSC-G-emp
.03 -1.24**
.03 Safety
Behavior
Lost Work 
Days
TSC-G-sup
Fig. 2. Indirect effect of group-level safety climate on lost work days due to road injury via safety behavior. Note: TSC-G-emp = employee group-level
trucking safety climate perceptions; TSC-G-sup = supervisory interpretation of group-level trucking safety climate; ** p < .01.
Table 4
Paired-sample t-test comparing employee group-level safety climate perceptions and supervisory interpretations (1831 employees & 219 supervisors).
Paired differences t df
Mean S.E. 95% CI
TSC-G .46 .02 .5 to .42 22.73** 1810
Notes: TSC-G = Trucking Safety Climate-Group-level.
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This study increases our understanding of the lone worker context by examining employee safety climate and supervisory
interpretations of safety climate, how similar or different they are, and how they are related to important safety outcomes.
Results from Objective 1 provided support for the measurement equivalence of the Trucking Safety Climate Scale at the
organization level for both employees and supervisors. This means that, regardless of whether respondents were employees
or supervisors, there was an ‘‘equality of item level and sub-scale level true scores for persons with identical latent scores’’
(Raju et al., 2002). This ﬁnding highlights the utility of the scale, as it shows that it can be used to make meaningful com-
parisons between employee perceptions and supervisory interpretations of organization-level safety climate. The same
method can be generalized to other research questions when data from different groups are collected (e.g., when conducting
cross-cultural comparisons by collecting data from people in different cultures/countries) using the same scale.
After measurement equivalence was established for organization-level safety climate, the results of the study revealed
that supervisors’ and employees’ scores were statistically different and supervisors’ interpretations of both organization-
and group-level safety climate were higher than employees’ perceptions (as shown from the results of Objectives 2 and
4). Moreover, for both organization- and group-level safety climate scores, only the employees’ perceptions were predictive
of safety outcomes (as shown from the results of Objectives 3 and 5). This is a striking result; although supervisors and
employees were interpreting the scales in the same way (as assessed by measurement equivalence), their scores were sig-
niﬁcantly different. This ﬁnding occurs despite the fact that lone workers’ primary source of information, upon which their
safety climate perceptions were based, was their supervisors (e.g., Zohar et al., 2014). Ironically, the employees’ (supervisor-
informed) safety climate perceptions were more predictive of safety outcomes than the safety climate interpretations of the
supervisors themselves.
As stated earlier, we have utilized prior research to propose separate theoretical explanations for supervisor-employee
differences at the organization level and group level. However, given the observed pattern of results, we believe that it would
be more useful to propose a more integrated argument which addresses organization and group levels within a single frame-
work. This framework includes the following assumptions: (a) For lone workers, unlike in traditional workplaces, a primary
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likely to be the actions of their supervisor; and (b) The knowledge structures contained within the supervisors’ mental mod-
els provide the foundation for our theoretical proposals.
Our integrated approach includes elements of the following: gatekeeper model (Zohar & Luria, 2010), increased opportu-
nity to observe approach (Lawler, 1967), social desirability (Maccoby & Maccoby, 1954), and self-assessment bias (Mount,
1984a,b; Borman, 1997). For the gatekeeper model there are two likely patterns which are characteristic of supervisor
behavior. In the ﬁrst pattern, the supervisor correctly assesses that top management’s policy can be characterized by parity
between enacted and espoused supports of safety. Being closer to top management compared to the lone workers, supervi-
sors may be better able to discern the true priorities of upper management. However, in their gatekeeper role, supervisors
bring in their own values when interpreting company climate to their group members. For example, a supervisor may be
willing to disregard safety policies/procedures when production falls behind and expect drivers to respond to cell phone
communications when on the road. Consider how this situation may be represented in this supervisor’s mental model.
The supervisor may internalize an accurate representation of top management policy in the declarative knowledge structure
component of his mental model. At the same time, the inﬂuence of social desirability and self-assessment biases lead to a
representation of his/her own interpretation of management policy as also positive, and close to that of management. In con-
trast, the actual operational decisions of the supervisor (e.g., calling drivers on their cell phones) are based on the procedural
components of his/her mental model and form the primary source of information upon which his/her employees base their
safety climate perceptions. This is manifest in the distinction between sent and received messages (Katz & Kahn, 1978; Mer-
ton, 1957; Zohar & Polachek, 2014). Interestingly, it is in the content of the received messages that the predictive power of
employee ratings of safety climate reside.
Thus, in responding to the organizational-level safety climate survey questions, the supervisor will rely on the relatively
more accurate set of declarative knowledge structures relating to top management internalized in his/her mental model.
However, in responding to the group-level self-assessment safety climate questions, he/she will rely on knowledge struc-
tures relating to his/her own interpretation of management policy; structures likely subject to social desirability and self-
serving bias. In contrast, employees will utilize the information originating in supervisor behaviors derived from procedural
knowledge structures in the supervisor mental model to respond to both the organization-level and group-level surveys.
Consequently, employee scores on both surveys are signiﬁcantly lower than supervisor scores, and are predictive of safety
outcomes. Supervisor scores, on the other hand, are based on information which is discrepant with the actual situation on
the ground and do not predict safety outcomes.
Further evidence for this explanation rests on the fact that the correlation between employees’ organizational- and group-
level safety climate scores is very high (r = 0.75). This would support the assertion that the primary source of information
upon which employees base their organizational safety climate perceptions is the supervisor.
This explanation accounts for only one aspect of the gatekeeper model. In the 2nd pattern, one might expect some super-
visory gate-keepers to bemore supportive of their drivers than top management. For example, top management may not set
a speciﬁc policy on cell phone use, but supervisors communicate to drivers the importance of not using cell phones while
driving and they never call them when they are on the road, behaving in accordance with this viewpoint. Under this situa-
tion, it would be expected that supervisors would interpret organizational safety climate as lower than employees perceive it
to be. We did not ﬁnd evidence to support this pattern of behavior. As it happens, out of the eight companies in the overall
study (Huang et al., 2013), the four companies that (a) agreed to allow supervisors to participate and (b) provided objective
safety outcomes, also had the highest average safety climate scores. It is perhaps the case that, since all the supervisors in the
current study came from companies with high overall safety climate scores, it is more likely that these supervisors may
reﬂect the ﬁrst gatekeeper pattern mentioned above in which the supervisors are less supportive than top management.
An obvious way to more clearly test this explanation would be to replicate the investigation with a sample that contained
companies across a broader range of safety climate.
In the conduct of this study, attempts were made to minimize social desirability bias (Maccoby & Maccoby, 1954).
Participants were assured of conﬁdentiality of their responses, web surveys were used which both supervisors and drivers
could answer privately, a double-blind coding system was used to identify participants so that no names were collected, and
participants were informed that only group-level aggregated data would be provided back to the company. The relative
accuracy of the employee’s perceptions at both the organizational- and group-level, as evidenced by signiﬁcant predictions
of safety outcomes, would argue that social desirability inﬂuences, if present, were less evident for the workers than for
supervisors. For the organizational-level scores, the data suggest that supervisors were more likely to interpret management
policies in a positive direction.
As discussed earlier, without additional qualitative research, the actual reasons causing the differences between super-
visors and employees’ perceptions in the study are uncertain. Future research should further investigate the root causes
of these perceptual gaps and take the root causes into account when designing and implementing interventions to improve
overall workplace safety.
4.1. Practical Implications
The results have important practical implications. When supervisors’ interpretations of safety climate are higher than
those of their employees, it means they perceive that the company prioritizes safety more strongly than the employees
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procedures, and practices if only management’s perceptions are used to make decisions. If the supervisors’ scores for orga-
nization-level safety climate do, in fact, reﬂect true priorities of upper management (i.e., prioritizing safety over competing
demands), it is important that this information be passed down to front-line employees because supervisor interpretations
alone are not directly related to employee safety outcomes. This may present a challenge to organizations in the trucking
industry (and other organizations employing lone workers), as their front-line workers have limited opportunities to interact
with top management.
The results of the study further revealed that supervisors’ interpretations of safety climate were not leading indicators of
employee future safety outcomes; only employee perceptions signiﬁcantly predicted safety behaviors and future injuries.
The ﬁndings of this study suggest that employees’ safety climate scores can be used to help managers and supervisors be
more realistic in their understanding of the way in which the company’s values regarding safety are perceived by their work-
ers (e.g., Cheyne et al., 2003). Using a safety climate scale to understand their employees’ points of viewmay help supervisors
identify issues and make subsequent changes that will improve employees’ safety climate perceptions, thus decreasing acci-
dents and injuries.
Another practical implication is the importance of utilizing employee perceptions to inform potential training and inter-
ventions. Sometimes information about the current status of particular jobs and work is obtained from supervisors rather
than employees; however, it may be the case that supervisors are not always aware of the decisions that workers face
between working harder or faster and heeding all possible safety hazards. Our results suggest that there is a need to improve
the correspondence between supervisors’ safety climate interpretations and employees’ safety climate. Communication with
one’s supervisor is still one of the main ways employees are informed about organizational policies and procedures and the
types of behaviors that are rewarded or punished (Zohar et al., 2014), especially in the case of lone workers. Literature has
shown that supervisor training on increasing safety communication with their employees can improve employees’ safety
outcomes (Zohar & Luria, 2003; Zohar & Polachek, 2014). In this case, providing safety training on communication or more
opportunities for two-way communication between supervisors and employees may be used to bridge the gap. Again, this
study points to the necessity of considering employee perceptions, as they are more closely related to the outcomes of inter-
est (at least in the case of lone workers).
4.2. Limitations
Overall, the contributions of this study should be viewed in light of several limitations. First, although objective outcome
data were collected six months after survey administration, the survey itself was cross-sectional. A future longitudinal study
will provide stronger evidence for causal relationships between safety climate, safety behavior and outcomes. Second, this
study focuses on the results of safety climate surveys administered to employees and supervisors in a lone working situation
speciﬁc to the trucking industry. This research could also be extended to lone workers in other job types and industries.
Third, this study utilized only one objective outcome (lost work days). Future research would beneﬁt from utilizing other
outcomes (e.g., accident near-misses), as well as data collected over a longer period of time (for example, one year after sur-
vey administration). Furthermore, similar to other survey studies, the data in this study were self-reported (except for the
objective outcome of injury severity) and social desirability effects (and/or self-assessment biases from supervisors) might
have been a factor. Caution needs to be used when interpreting the validity of these survey results. Lastly, additional studies
should compare safety climate interpretations and perceptions of other employees (in addition to front-line workers and
their direct supervisors), including safety managers and upper management.5. Conclusion
The results of this study make signiﬁcant contributions to the safety climate literature. First, the study demonstrates
measurement equivalence of the organization-level safety climate sub-scale items among supervisor interpretations of
safety climate and employee safety climate. Second, it provides empirical evidence that supervisor interpretations of safety
climate are not congruent with employee perceptions for lone workers, and supervisors give higher ratings. Third, employee
safety climate perceptions, but not supervisor interpretations of safety climate, signiﬁcantly predicted safety behavior and
days away from work due to injury (an indicator of injury severity). The results provide support for traditional safety climate
literature, and suggest that when trying to gauge and improve upon a trucking company’s safety climate, employees’
perceptions are more indicative of safety behaviors and outcomes than supervisors’ interpretations.
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